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In the past three decades, farm families have relied on government payments and off-farm income to reduce
income risk and increase total household income. Many studies have analyzed the role of government payments;
however, little is known about the impact of health insurance coverage on labor allocation. This study builds on
previous literature by using copulas to test for dependence in the labor allocation, addressing the importance of
fringe benefits to the farm household, and determining how these considerations affect our knowledge of the
impact of fringe benefits on off-farm labor. The results indicate that the off-farm hours worked by the operator and
spouse are jointly determined; health insurance coverage is an endogenous variable. Using the predicted probability
of insurance coverage and joint estimation techniques, we find a positive and highly significant relationship with
the hours worked off-farm. Further, we find that both coupled and decoupled payments are negatively correlated
with the hours worked off-farm.
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During the past three decades, self-employed farm
households have engaged in dual employment—farm
and off-farm work. Dual employment has provided a
critical income source to a majority of self-employed
farm households not only in the U.S. and Western
European countries, but in developing economies as well
(e.g., [1-6]). Economists have investigated several issues—
particularly public policy, education, and wealth—that im-
pact the dual employment decisions of self-employed farm
operators and/or spouses.
Most surveyed farm families claim that off-farm work
provides extra, much-needed income to support family
expendituresa [2]. Yet, surveys conducted by the USDA
indicate reasons unrelated to the farm business, from
buying groceries to funding retirement accounts as reasons
for off-farm work [7]. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
many self-employed business owners and/or their family
members work off-farm to provide fringe benefits. Fringe* Correspondence: jdanto3@gmail.com
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in any medium, provided the original work is pbenefits are viewed as a component of off-farm wage.
Jensen and Salant [8] demonstrate the positive correlation
between fringe benefits and the number of hours farmers
are employed off the farm. However, Jensen and Salant’s
data is mainly local and small in scope (800 farms in
Mississippi and Tennessee). Additionally, this research was
conducted prior to both the decoupling of government
payments and significant increases in healthcare costs.
Figure 1 shows that only 50 percent of individuals from
farm families have employer-provided health insurance.
Given the extensive engagement of farm-operator house-
holds in the nonfarm economy, it is not surprising that
the most common source of health insurance for mem-
bers of farm households is employment-based. This is
in stark contrast to nearly 75% of the non-farm sector
having private health insurance from employers. Even
more staggering, approximately 40 percent of individuals
from farm households—compared to the 7 percent of
individuals in all other U.S. households—purchase health
insurance directly from a vendor. Without accounting
for additional income, working off-farm can substantially
decrease financial stress for farm households by providing
fringe benefits (health insurance in particular). Programss an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
Figure 1 Heath care coverage and source of health care coverage (National Health Interview Survey, 1997–2004).
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decreasing the need to personally fund these benefits, work
fewer hours off-farm, and work more hours on the farm—
especially if there are non-pecuniary benefits to farm labor.
Until now, these considerations have been difficult to
model due to a lack of data. In particular, the literature
has been all but silent on the probability of getting
employer-provided health insurance from an off-farm job
and, if received, the subsequent impact on off-farm work.
During the past two decades, considerable research
has focused on agricultural policy and its unintended
consequences on factor markets. Among this research
are analyses of the labor allocation decisions of farm
families. Factors such as non-farm, economic growth and
farm program payments have been tied to the migration
of farm operators and spouses to off-farm work. Often
overlooked is the role of fringe benefits, like health insur-
ance and retirement plans, in drawing farm households to
work off-farm. D’Antoni and Mishra [9] demonstrate that
the welfare lost by farm households from a reduction in
decoupled government payments may be overstated
when fringe benefits are excluded from the estimation
of off-farm labor supply.
An issue that has garnered attention in the literature is
the interdependence of farm operators and spouses in
off-farm work. Most dual employment studies begin by
using a theoretical household model that posits jointness
in farm couples’ decisions to participate in off-farm work.
Researchers then estimate bivariate probit/Tobit models
for off-farm labor of the operator and spouse. They then
test for jointness post hoc via hypothesis testing for the
correlation parameter (rho) between the error terms of the
simultaneous equations. We find, however, that copulas
provide a more efficient and consistent procedure for
testing dependence early in the investigative process. The
results of this test can then be used to guide empirical
methods rather than the status quo of simple verification.
Therefore, the objective of this study is threefold. First,
we utilize copulas to measure the dependence betweenmarried farm couples’ off-farm labor supply. Unlike the
previous studies, copulas provide a consistent procedure
for testing dependence and guiding the choice of empirical
model. Secondly, we test for endogeneity of health insur-
ance coverage and determine the impact of this fringe
benefit on the off-farm labor supply of farm operators
and spouses. Thirdly, we assess the impact of reduced
decoupled paymentsb on the off-farm labor supply of
farm operators and spouses. The data used in this research
is from the 2006–2008 Agricultural Resource Management
Survey (ARMS). The results of our copula test indicate that
the labor supply decisions of farm couples are best modeled
jointly. Using a bivariate Tobit model, we find health insur-
ance coverage has a highly significant and positive impact
on the off-farm labor supply of operators and spouses.
Finally, meaningful evidence indicates that a reduction
in decoupled payments would increase the hours worked
off-farm by the operator and spouse.
Health insurance for self-employed farmers in the
United States
Unlike health care system in Western Europe, where
government plays a significant role in the healthcare
sector, the health care system in the United States is
employer-sponsored health insurance, which is offered
to employees as part of a compensation package. Such a
system can present challenges to self-employed individuals,
such as farmers and ranchers, and their families. Although
most farmers are self-employed, the share of farm operator
household members that have no form of health insurance
is about the same as that of the overall U.S. population (13
and 16 percent, respectively). A farm business does not
generally offer employment-based health insurance, but
other factors help to equalize insurance coverage. Farm
operator households spend much more on health care than
the average of all U.S. households, largely due to their greater
reliance on direct-purchase private health insurance. For
example, in 2007, farm households spent, on average, $5,200
for both health insurance premiums and out-of-pocket
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for whom farming is their primary occupation, health ex-
penses are even higher, averaging nearly $6,000 in 2007.
Primary-occupation farm households have higher health ex-
penses than other farm households, even when they include
household members working off the farm. For the primary-
occupation households that rely solely on direct purchase
health insurance, total out-of-pocket health expenses
averaged nearly $10,000 in 2007 [10].
However, in the majority of farm operator households,
the operator or spouse is also employed off the farm, so the
most common source of health insurance for members of
farm households is employment based. In addition, having
health insurance increases with a person's age and income.
Farm operator households are more than three times as
likely as other household types to be headed by an individ-
ual over age 65. Farm operator households also have higher
incomes and net worth, on average, than the general U.S.
population, but much of their net worth is tied up in their
farming business and farm income can vary widely from
year to year. Given that farm operator households have
relatively high net worth and tend to rely on family
labor to operate the farm business, adequate health
insurance coverage for household members may be as
important to the financial security of the farm business
as it is to the health of the family.
Methods
The following theoretical model of the farm household
illustrates the operator/spouse dependence in off-farm
hours worked [3,11]. The farm household is comprised
by the farm operator (O) and spouse (S) and follows a
utility maximization framework which assumes that utility
(U) is a function of leisure (L) and income (I).
Max U ¼ U Lo; Ls; Ið Þ ð1Þ
s:t:
Lo þ Fo þ Eo Esð Þ−T ¼ 0 ð2Þ
Ls þ Fs þ Es Eoð Þ−T ¼ 0 ð3Þ
woEE
o Esð Þ þ wsEEs Eoð Þ þ πF þ V−I ¼ 0 ð4Þ
Lo; Fo; Eo Esð Þ≥0 Ls; Fs; Es Eoð Þ≥0 ð5Þ
Utility maximization in equation (1) is subject to the
total available hours (T) allocable to leisure (L), farm labor
(F), and off-farm labor (E) of the operator (Equation 2)
and spouse (Equation 3), the full income constraint
(Equation 4), and non-negativity constraints (Equation 5).
Notice that the off-farm hours of the operator (Eo) are a
function of the off-farm hours worked by the spouse (Es).
This explicitly demonstrates the jointness in off-farm labor
allocation. The full income constraint is defined as thesum of income from the operator’s off-farm labor (woEE
o
Esð Þ), spouse’s off-farm labor (wsEEs Eoð Þ), farm profits (πF),
and other household non-labor income (V) minus the total
income (I). Farm profits are further defined as the value of
farm production minus the input costs. Specifically,
πF ¼ Pf f Fo; Fs;Xf
 
− vXf ð6Þ
The Lagrangian (L) can be constructed for the outlined
maximization problem with the following first order con-
ditions for off-farm labor:
U Lo; Ls; Ið Þ þ λ1 Lo þ Fo þ Eo Esð Þ−Tð Þ
þ λ2 Ls þ Fs þ Es Eoð Þ−Tð Þ




























Per the cross-partial derivative in equations (8) and
(9), if the off-farm labor allocation decision of the spouse




∂Es = 0. For
the operator, this implies that utility is maximized where
the marginal rate of substitution (MRSoL;I ) between leisure
and income is exactly equal to the off-farm wage. Accord-
ing to Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre [3], there is conflicting
empirical evidence supporting the validity of independence.
This will be formally tested using the copula methods
described by [9].
If we allow for dependence in our theoretical model and
expand our concept of the “wage” earned from off-work,
we can say the full off-farm wage is a function of both the
hourly wage (w) and fringe benefits (fb). Therefore, woE and











By rearranging the first order conditions in equations (8)
and (9) and including our newly defined terms for off-
farm wage, we can see more clearly the impact of health









¼ woE woE; f b














¼ wsE wsE; f b







The total wage is non-decreasing in woE; w
s
E; and fb
(holding all else constant). For example, an increase in
health insurance benefits received off-farm will increase
D’Antoni et al. Health Economics Review 2014, 4:19 Page 4 of 11
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/19fb. In equation (11), an increase in fb will result in an in-













will either increase or decrease
depending on the direction of dependence.
Based on the empirical results of D’Antoni and Mishra
([9] using copulas and the post-hoc tests of Ahearn et al.




> 0 and increasing fringe benefits
will increase the total off-farm wage earned by the spouse;
resulting in an increase in the right hand side of the equal-
ity in equation (11) implying greater substitution of leisure
for income and greater hours worked off-farm. It’s import-
ant to note that the discussed changes in fringe benefits
under joint labor decisions will alter the off-farm labor
supply of both the operator and spouse.
Off-farm labor supply: an empirical model
A seemingly unrelated regression model can be adapted
such that a Tobit model can be used rather than simple
regression [12]. Specifically,


















Equations (12) and (13) represent off-farm labor supply
equations for the operator and spouse. Y 1 and Y

2 are the
untruncated latent variables allowing for theoretically
negative values which represent hours worked off-farm
by the operator and spouse, respectively.Y1 and Y2 are
the left-censored dependent variables for off-farm hours
worked by the operator and spouse, respectively. Vectors
Xi and Xk are explanatory variables. We separately denote
the explanatory variables, insurance coverage variable
for the operator (HO) and spouse (HS), and error terms
for operator (ε1) and spouse (ε2). These disturbances
are jointly normally distributed with variances σ21 and







is given by σ1,2 = ρσ1σ2.
The results from this model are not directly interpret-
able as the marginal effect of the independent variable on
the dependent variable; therefore, we further calculate the
marginal effects. According to Greene [13], the marginal
effects in a bivariate Tobit context can be calculated in the
same manner as a univariate model:
∂E Yð Þ
∂X
¼ Φ Xβ=σð Þβ ð16Þ
where Φ(Xβ/σ) is the cumulative normal distribution
function.The explanatory variables (HO) and (HS) are dummy
variables representing whether the operator or spouse
obtains health insurance coverage from off-farm sources.
In prior studies, researchers [2,5,14-17] began by imple-
menting a theoretical household model where the labor
allocation decision is jointly determined. When joint
estimation methods were used, bivariate probit/Tobit
models were estimated. A correlation parameter (rho),
that measures the dependence between the error terms
of two simultaneous off-farm labor functions, was then
tested against the null hypothesis of rho equals zero.
The empirical evidence of dependence is inconclusive
in these studies. Furthermore, this method assessed the
appropriateness of the empirical model for the theory post
hoc. In these studies, testing the dependence between
operator and spouse labor decisions has been approached
more from the perspective of testing “goodness of fit”
rather than as a useful tool for guiding model selection.





∂Es are significantly different from zero and
to determine whether dependence is positive or negative.
Based on the literature, we suspect that health insurance
coverage is determined jointly with the number of off-
farm hours worked. The Smith-Blundell test is used to test
for endogeneity because the structural model is a Tobit
[18]. Under this test, the null hypothesis states that all
variables are exogenous while the alternative hypothesis
states that insurance coverage is a linear projection of a
set of instruments. The residuals from this first stage
regression are added to the model. If the null is not
rejected, then these residuals have no explanatory power.
However, for both the operator and spouse equations the
null hypothesis is rejected.
Endogeneity of health insurance coverage
To address endogeneity of the health insurance variable in
our model, we use the predicted probability of insurance
coverage for the operator and spouse. Following the
results of our copula test, we model the predicted prob-
ability of insurance coverage jointly using the bivariate
probit model. According to Greene [13] and Ahearn,
El-Osta, and Dewbre [3]
y1 ¼ β
0
1X1 þ ε1 if y1 ¼ 1





2X2 þ ε2 if y2 ¼ 1
0 if y2 ¼ 0

ð18Þ
E ε1 X1; X2 ¼ E ε2 X1; X2 ¼ 0j½j½ ð19Þ
var ε1 X1; X2 ¼ var ε2 X1; X2 ¼ 1j½j½ ð20Þ












Household Size −0.0414*** −0.0747***
(0.0114) (0.0110)
Personal Insurance Policy 0.1736*** 0.2188***
(0.0293) (0.0267)








***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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where y1 and y2 are binary variables indicating health
insurance coverage from off-farm work for the operator
and spouse, X1 and X2 are vectors of exogenous variables,
β1 and β2 are vectors of estimated parameters, ε1 and ε2
are error terms, and θ is the coefficient of correlation
between the error terms.
When specifying the equations in the bivariate probit
model, there must be at least one variable that is highly
correlated with the dependent variable in equations (17)
and (18) but uncorrelated with the dependent variables in
(12) and (14). There are two exogenous instruments used
in these equations. The first variable indicates personal
expenditure on insurance, health, and retirement benefits.
The second variable indicates expenditure on fringe bene-
fits for hired workers. The latter variable is expected to
be negatively correlated with operator/spouse insurance
coverage from off-farm work. If a farm household is
going to pay for benefits to cover its hired workers, then it
is more likely to cover itself as well. Personal expenditure
on insurance, health, and retirement benefits is indetermin-
ate in sign. It can be argued that farm households expend-
ing personal funds on these benefits are less likely to be
covered by other sources; they likely pay these expenses out
of necessity. Conversely, it can be argued that those paying
for these expenses are more concerned about being fully
insured and financially secure; therefore, they seek out off-
farm employment providing these benefits as well.
In addition to these exogenous instruments, we regress
operator and spouse insurance coverage on age, age
squared, education, and household size. The results from
this regression are found in Table 1. Notice the explanatory
variables are all significant at 1%. We further test for instru-
ment strength using a joint F-test for the operator and
spouse equations. The F-test value for each equation was
large and significant at 1%; therefore, we can reject the null
that all parameters are jointly equal to zero and conclude
that at least one of our instruments in each equation is not
weak.
From these results, we calculate the predicted probabil-
ity of the operator having health insurance from off-farm
sources holding the spouse’s equation constant and vice
versa. These predicted values will then be used in our
structural model outlined by equations (12) - (14). These
equations can be rewritten with the predicted values
notated H^ O and H^ S as:

















This bivariate Tobit model will be estimated via max-
imum likelihood. Due to the use of predicted values and
complex survey design, standard errors were calculated
using bootstrapping techniques. Following Cameron and
Trivedi [19], 500 iterations were used in our calculation
of standard errors.
Data
This research utilizes Agricultural Resource Management
Survey (ARMS) data from 2006 to 2008. The ARMS is con-
ducted annually by the Economic Research Service and the
National Agricultural Statistics Service (for more detail, see
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/arms-farm-financial-
and-crop-production-practices.aspx#.u_swgfldwso). The sur-
vey collects data to measure the financial condition (farm
income, expenses, assets, and debts) and operating charac-
teristics of farm businesses, the cost of producing agricul-
tural commodities, and the well-being of farm operator
households. The target population of the survey is operators
associated with farm businesses representing agricultural
production in the 48 contiguous states. Each survey is
collected from a single, senior farm operator who makes
most of the day-to-day management decisions. We also
collected wage data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. By
state and year, we calculate the weighted average wage
earned from off-farm work, weighting according to the
portion of the state population employed in each sector.
D’Antoni et al. Health Economics Review 2014, 4:19 Page 6 of 11
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/19The list of variables, with summary statistics, used
in our labor supply model can be found in Table 2.
We limited our study to farm households where either
the farm operator or spouse is under the age of 65,
resulting in a sample size of 11,262 farm households.
This excludes all households that are fully covered by
Medicare. We also exclude all households that did not
respond to hours worked off-farm or reported hours
per week worked on or off-farm greater than 140. This
applies to farms that reported 140 worked at either
location separately or additively. In other words, any
operator or spouse responding that they on average
sleep fewer than four hours per night is assumed
to have incorrectly completed the survey and are
dropped.
The ARMS has a complex, stratified, multiframe design
where observations in the ARMS represent a number ofTable 2 Summary statistics and variables used in the study
Variables Description
Operator_off-farm Off-Farm hours per week
Spouse_off-farm Off-Farm hours per week
Op_Age Age in years
Sp_Age Age in years
Op_Educ Total years of education
Sp_Educ Total years of education
Op_Miles Miles from off-farm job
Sp_Miles Miles from off-farm job
Op_Hinsurance 1 if the operator has health insurance thr
Sp_Hinsurance 1 if the spouse has health insurance thro
Of_Wage Hourly off-farm wage rate
Decoupled_Payments Annual payments in $1,000
Coupled_Payments Annual payments in $1,000
Farm_Sales Total value of farm sales in $1,000
Household_size Number of members of household
F_Dairy 1 if the farm specializes in dairy farming;
R_Heartland 1 if farm located in the Heartland region;
R_Northern Crescent 1 if farm located in the Northern Crescen
R_Northern Great Plains 1 if farm located in the Northern Great P
R_Prairie Gateway 1 if farm located in the Prairie Gateway re
R_Eastern Upland 1 if farm located in the Easter Upland reg
R_Southern Seaboard 1 if farm located in the Southern Seaboa
R_Fruitful Rim 1 if farm located in the Fruitful Rim regio
R_Basin and Range 1 if farm located in the Basin and Range
R_Mississippi Portal 1 if farm located in the Mississippi Portal
y2006 1 if data from year 2006; 0 Otherwise
y2007 1 if data from year 2007; 0 Otherwise
y2008 1 if data from year 2008; 0 Otherwise
Source: Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), 2006, 2007, and 2008.similar farms when using the provided expansion factors.
The expansion factors are most useful and recommended
when the full survey is used, generalizations about the
entire population of farms is made based on the results,
or simple univariate analysis is conducted. Under this
scenario, the recommended method for calculating the
variance is the delete-a-group jackknife procedure [20].
There is not clear or unanimous support for using the
jackknife approach when using subsets of the data or
complex, multivariate analyses. Goodwin and Mishra [21]
argue that it is not clear whether stratification alters
the likelihood function beyond the simple weights and
whether it is appropriate to apply the predefined jackknife
replicate weights to subsamples of the ARMS data. So,
similar to El-Osta [22], we employ a bootstrapping tech-
nique rather than the jackknife procedure to remedy









ough off-farm work; 0 Otherwise 0.21 (0.41)






0 Otherwise 0.12 (0.32)
0 Otherwise 0.17 (0.38)
t region; 0 Otherwise 0.16 (0.37)
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The dependent variables in our off-farm labor supply
equations are the hours per week worked off-farm by
the operator and spouse, respectively. For each equation,
we include explanatory variables for age, age squared,
education, household size, distance from the off-farm
job, off-farm wage, and whether they obtain health
insurance from an off-farm source. Explanatory variables
of the model are based on the theoretical model empir-
ical literature on off-farm labor supply [3,16,23-25].
Refinements in the off-farm work literature has been
extensive, largely using farm household cross-sectional
micro data. The specific survey question asks respondents
under the age of 65 whether they have insurance coverage
from an off-farm job and 21% of the operators in our
sample report that they were covered by an off-farm
job. As expected, more spouses (30%) reported that they
received insurance coverage from an off-farm employment
source. As will be determined in the following section,
we suspect that off-farm insurance coverage is jointly
determined with the hours worked off-farm. Individuals
working greater hours off-farm are more like to receive
health insurance benefits and off-farm benefits are not
likely to be received until a certain number of hours are
accrued each week. The operator insurance and spouse
insurance variables are found endogenous, so we will
estimate the predicted probability of insurance coverage
and include these estimates as explanatory variables in our
labor supply equation.
In addition to operator and spouse specific variables, we
use farm, location, and time specific variables as explana-
tory variables. Farm-specific variables include decoupled
and coupled government payments, total farm sales, and
an indicator for dairy farms (which are specified due to
the labor intensive nature of these farms). Previous studies
that have included variables like coupled and decoupled
payments, farm sized, specialization [2,16,17,21] and
reported significant effects on off-farm labor supply of
operators and spouses. We included location-specific
variables such as metro/non-metro and ERS Resource
region (Figure 2) as a proxy for local labor market condi-
tions. Consistent with previous literature ([24]; Gunter
[15,17,26]), we argue that inclusion of such variables cap-
tures the local labor market conditions, weather, growing
crops and growing seasons which can significantly affect
off-farm labor supply of operators and spouses. For the
ERS Resource regions, the Mississippi Portal is used as the
reference region in our study. Because we utilize a pooled
sample, indicator variables to specify year are included.
The reference year in this research is 2006.
Results and discussion
Table 3 presents the results of dependence in dual em-
ployment using the Frank and Clayton copula functions,respectively. First, we consider the results of the sym-
metric Frank copula. We find evidence of a positive and
highly significant relationship between the off-farm labor
supply of farm operators and spouses. The correlation
measure for this trial is consistent and ranges from 0.23
in 2006 to 0.19 in 2008. The pooled test of dependence
is similar, measuring about 0.22. These estimates add to
the confidence and power in using copulas to test for
dependence. Finally, the dependence parameter estimates
(column 3) are very consistent across the three surveys
and pooled data as well. Findings from the Frank copula
procedure guided our decision to use the Clayton copula
to constrain the dependence parameter to (0, ∞).
Results from the Clayton functional form are presented
in the lower panel of Table 3. Again we find evidence of a
positive and highly significant relationship between the
off-farm labor supply of farm operators and spouses.
Interestingly, the correlation correlations measured by the
Clayton copula are larger. For example, the correlation
measure ranges from 0.27 in 2006 to 0.23 in 2008. Finally,
the dependence parameter estimates (column 3) are very
consistent across the four surveys and pooled data as well.
Findings here suggest that an increase in operators’ off-
farm labor supply increases spouses’ off-farm labor supply;
hence, we choose to model the impact of health insurance
coverage on the off-farm labor supply of farm operators
and spouses using a bivariate Tobit model rather than
independent Tobit models.
The results in Tables 4 and 5 indicate a positive and
significant relationship between the predicted probability
of insurance coverage and the hours worked off-farm for
both the operator and spouse. Jointly considering the
results of our dependence estimates and insurance
coverage variables, our empirical results support the
theory that greater fringe benefits tend to increase the
hours worked off the farm by both farm operators and
spouses, ceteris paribus. Specifically, a one percent in-
crease in the probability of having health insurance
coverage from off-farm work increases off-farm hours
by 1 and 0.8 hours per week for operators and spouses,
respectively. Surprisingly, the hourly wage earned off-farm
was not significant in either equation. This finding lends
support to the relative importance of the fringe benefits
component of the full off-farm wage.
Another variable of special interest in this study is
decoupled payments. The coefficient on decoupled pay-
ments is negative and statistically significant at the 1
percent level of significance for both the operator and
spouse. These results imply the number of hours worked
off-farm by the operator and spouse will increase as
funding for decoupled payments decline. With respect
to coupled farm payments, decreased funding results in
more hours worked off-farm but to a lesser degree than
for decoupled payments. This relationship has been
Figure 2 Economic Research Service (ERS) Resource Regions.
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the participation decision [3,17,27]. Whether the add-
itional off-farm hours are drawn from farm labor or
leisure is indeterminate from these results.
The demographic variables for the operator and spouse
had different impacts on off-farm labor supply. The oper-
ator age, age squared, and education were all insignificant.
Alternatively, the age of the spouse was found to increase
the number of hours worked off-farm but at a decreasing
rate. For example, results in Table 5 indicate that each
additional year in the spouse’s age increases off-farm
hours by about 0.90 hour per week. Household size also
had a differential impact on the hours worked off-farm by
the operator and spouse. Larger households were posi-
tively correlated with greater hours worked off-farm by
the operator. Considering the documented relationship
between income stability and off-farm labor supply [16],
this makes sense: operators need a more stable and gener-
ous source of income to support larger families. However,
larger households were found to be negatively correlated
with hours worked off-farm by the spouse. This is likely
due to increased value of at-home time and the establishedTable 3 Testing for dependence between hours worked off-fa










*** indicates significance at the 1% level.notion that spouses are increasingly responsible for house-
hold labor rather than monetary wages as household size
grows [3,16,28].
In addition to operator and spouse characteristics,
location and characteristics of the farm itself also play
an important role in off-farm labor supply. Results in
Tables 4 and 5 indicate that farms specializing in dairy
production tend to have operators and spouses who
work fewer hours off-farm. This result is expected due
to the fact that dairy farming is more labor-intensive
than many farming operations so operators and spouses
allocate fewer (if any) hours for off-farm work [3,16].
Tables 4 and 5 also indicate that distance to the off-farm
job has a positive and significant impact on the off-farm
labor supply of farm operators and spouses. A plausible
explanation may be that mileage traveled to off-farm work
is considered as a fixed cost to the employee, and there-
fore greater travel distances require higher earnings—
perhaps with fringe benefits—to justify the off-farm work
trips (see [16]). Holding wages and all else constant, the
worker must work greater hours off-farm to increase
earnings—which may include fringe benefits.rm by operator and spouse


















Op_Age −0.0777 (0.3219) 0.00000
Op_AgeSq −0.0027 (0.0032) 0.00000
Op_Educ 0.1168 (0.2168) 0.00000
Op_Miles 0.1991*** (0.0107) 0.12894***
Op_Hinsurance 103.4670*** (3.2572) 99.4560***
Of_Wage 0.2044 (0.2896) 0.20439
Decoupled_Payments −0.4075*** (0.0281) −0.11850***
Coupled_Payments −0.0333** (0.0154) −0.00946**
Farm_Sales −0.0010** (0.0004) −0.00024**
Household_Size 0.9400*** (0.3191) 0.91646***
Dairy_farm −28.5782*** (1.7309) −12.6058***
R_Heartland −0.4679 (2.1113) −0.22681
R_Northern Crescent 2.1882 (2.2940) 1.20937
R_Northern Great Plains −1.7238 (2.4179) −0.83510
R_Prairie Gateway 3.2268 (2.1801) 1.76193
R_Eastern Upland 1.4987 (2.1677) 0.78834
R_Southern Seaboard −5.6698*** (2.1646) −2.45213***
R_Fruitful Rim 0.2730 (2.2709) 0.13857








***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.








Sp_Age 0.8931*** (0.2571) 0.88983***
Sp_Agesq −0.0115*** (0.0028) −0.00004***
Sp_Educ −0.5963** (0.2479) −0.00067***
Sp_Miles 0.0213*** (0.0024) 0.01651***
Sp_Hinsurance 85.2026*** (4.3399) 82.5941***
Of_Wage 0.1232 (0.1965) 0.00000
Decoupled_Payments −0.0745*** (0.0134) −0.02185***
Coupled_Payments −0.0035 (0.0083) −0.00110
Farm_Sales −0.0012*** (0.0002) −0.00028***
Household_Size −0.5262** (0.2428) −0.01318***
Dairy_farm −6.9291*** (0.9781) −3.05645***
R_Heartland 0.9716 (1.3928) 0.52927
R_Northern Crescent −1.3571 (1.5300) −0.61083
R_Northern Great Plains −1.7883 (1.5954) −0.85499
R_Prairie Gateway −2.0328 (1.4505) −0.92525
R_Eastern Upland −2.6948* (1.4695) −1.21925*
R_Southern Seaboard −1.6355 (1.4328) −0.73462
R_Fruitful Rim −4.0687*** (1.5186) −1.71412***








***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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in determining off-farm labor supply (demonstrated in
Table 4 for the farm operator and Table 5 for the spouse).
Farm operators located in the Southern Seaboard region
(Figure 2) supply less off-farm labor (2.4 hours per week)
compared to farms located in the Mississippi Portal
region. This likely occurs because the Mississippi Portal
region tends to have smaller farms specializing in livestock
and mixed grains so operators of these farms are able to
work more off the farm [2]. On the other hand, spouses
of farming households located in the Fruitful Rim, Basin
and Range, and Eastern Upland regions work less (1.2 to
1.7 hours per week) off the farm, compared to spouses in
the Mississippi Portal region. With respect to the Fruitful
Rim and Basin and Range, perhaps this result is due to the
large number of fruit and vegetable farms in this area. Like
dairy farms, the labor intensive nature of these farms may
force spouses to devote more time to farm labor.Dummy variables for the year in which the data was col-
lected were included in the regression. Relative to 2006,
both operators and spouses worked fewer hours off-farm
in 2007. In 2008, operators but not spouses worked fewer
hours off-farm than in 2006. This finding may suggest that
economic conditions in the farm sector improved relative
to the non-farm economy and thereby decreased off-farm
labor supply of farm operators and spouses. Perhaps this
is due in large part to the recession beginning in 2007.
Finally, notice the estimate for the dependence parameter
rho (0.3652). The positive and significant correlation be-
tween error terms confirms the findings of our copula test.
Conclusions
Previous research on off-farm labor supply has ignored
the role of employer-sponsored health insurance coverage
in determining farm operator and spouses’ decisions to
work off the farm. Nearly 40 percent of individuals from
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http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/19farm households purchase health insurance coverage
directly from the vendors, compared to 7 percent of all
other U.S. households. This study provides evidence that
observed off-farm labor participation of farm operators
and spouses is indeed influenced by employer-sponsored
health care coverage. We find that government payments,
whether coupled or decoupled, have a negative effect on
the off-farm labor supply of farm operators and spouses.
Our study also demonstrates a strong positive relationship
between the probability of health insurance coverage and
the off-farm labor supply by the operator and spouse.
In addition, human capital, farm characteristics, and
participation in government programs are significant
determinants of off-farm labor supply by the operator
and spouse. We also find characteristics of the family and
spouse play an important role on the spouse’s decision to
work off the farm.
Recent changes in both healthcare and agricultural
policy may have a negative impact on the hours worked
off-farm by farm households. The 2014 Farm Bill elimi-
nated decoupled payments and instead expanded risk
management tools available to farmers. Based on our
results, lower decoupled payments over the duration of
the farm legislation would lead to fewer hours worked
away from the farm. Lower income from eliminating
decoupled payments and fewer hours worked off farm
result in lower levels of income, so the expectation is
that the farm household works more hours on the farm
rather than increasing leisure.
Similarly, this shift toward less off farm work and
greater hours of farm labor may be furthered by health-
care policy. As part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA),
insurance exchanges were created that allow very small
business owners access to health care and lower ex-
pected prices. This change decreases the relative total
wage differential between farm and off farm labor and is
expected to lead to fewer hours worked off farm. This is
especially true if the operator or spouse receives non-
pecuniary benefits from farming.
Drawing from these conclusions, a consideration worthy
of additional research is the impact on farm risk from these
changes. This literature has shown that stable income
sources like decoupled payments and off-farm labor are
important risk management tools that help stabilize the an-
nual income of farmers. With lower decoupled payments
and resulting decrease in off-farm work, does the expansion
of risk management programs in 2014 Farm Bill sufficiently
offset and further reduce the risk of farming?
Endnotes
aOff-farm provisions have been largely responsible for:
(1) closing the income gap between farm and nonfarm
households [2]; (2) food consumption and nutrition
[27,29]; and (3) farm input usage [30].bEl-Osta, Mishra and Ahearn [17] found that whether
one used estimated payments or actual payments, the
qualitative results did not differ. Hence, we use actual
decoupled and coupled payments in our model.
cIdeally, inclusion of operator/spouse’s health uncertainty
in theoretical model serves as the foundation of health
insurance. However, we have not included uncertainty
impacts in this simple framework.
dGenerally, farm size and farm asset values are positively
correlated. We include farm size (total farm sales) as an
indicator of financial variable and also wealth effect on
off-farm labor participation. Families with large farm
assets values are less likely to work of the farm.
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